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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Sandee Denise Cargile appeals in three separate cases. In 38855, Ms. Cargile
appeals from the Judgment of Conviction, wherein the district court imposed upon her a
unified thirteen-year sentence, with four years fixed, following her conditional guilty plea
to possession of a controlled substance.

She asserts that the district court erred in

denying her suppression motion because officers violated her constitutional rights to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure when they unreasonably extended the
length of the stop in order to have a drug dog run around the vehicle.
In 38867, Ms. Cargile appeals from the Order Of Revocation of Probation and
Imposition of Sentence and Commitment.

She contends the district court abused its

discretion when it executed the underlying sentence of five years, with one year fixed,
following her admission to violating probation.
In 38868, Ms. Cargile appeals from the Judgment & Commitment wherein the
district court imposed upon her a unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed,
following her guilty plea to escape. Ms. Cargile asserts that the district court abused its
discretion imposing an excessive sentence upon her.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings

A

Supreme Court Docket Number 38855
On the evening of June 23, 2010, Ms. Cargile drove her older 1964 pickup truck

in the area of Overland and Five Mile in Boise Idaho.
p.45, Ls.9-12.)

(Tr.10/28/2010, p.63, Ls.8-10,

There was a significant amount of traffic traveling both directions.

(Tr.10/28/2012, p.64, Ls.12-20.) During a turn, Ms. Cargile failed to use a turn signal
1

and continued driving for approximately two miles before Deputy Vogt initiated a traffic
stop. 1

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.45, Ls.13-23.)

The deputy did not immediately stop

Ms. Cargile because he wanted to follow her to observe her driving patterns.
(Tr.10/25/2010, p.45, Ls.19-23.) He did not observe any signs that would indicate that
Ms. Cargile might have been intoxicated, nor did he observe any other bad driving
patterns. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.62, Ls.7-10, p.82, L.25-p.83, L.2, p.83, Ls.3-5.)
Although the deputy could not recall if she was wearing sunglasses, he thought
she was looking at him out of the corner of her eye.

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.63, Ls.14-17,

p.64, Ls.1-2, p.83, Ls.13-15.) He believed she avoided looking directly at him in the
mirror. (Tr.10/25/2012, p.63, Ls.4-6, 14-17.) Before activating his lights, which were
located down in the windshield of the vehicle and not on the overhead of the car,
Deputy Vogt called for a canine unit.

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.82, Ls.8-10, p.83, Ls.9-12.)

Ms. Cargile was traveling in the inner lane, closest to the center lane. (Tr.10/25/2010,
p.65, Ls.3-8.) After activating his lights, Ms. Cargile continued driving for approximately
a quarter of a mile. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.46, Ls.11-14.) He thought she was trying to act
as if she did not see him.

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.63, Ls.21-24.)

In order to obtain

Ms. Cargile's attention, Deputy Vogt activated his siren with a few quick audible burst.
(Tr.10/25/2010, p.46, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Cargile turned into the center turn lane, pulled into
a business' parking lot off Overland, and parked in an actual marked parking lot stall,
which the officer thought was strange. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.67, Ls.9-19.)
Although the deputy testified that Ms. Cargile's parking decision made him
nervous, he immediately approached the vehicle without waiting for backup that had

1

For purposes of the suppression motion, Ms. Cargile conceded that she committed a
traffic infraction, although she disputed the factual basis that she failed to use her turn
signal. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.91, L.21-p.92, L.6.)
2

already been called

nor used any other unusual procedure to approach her.

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.60, Ls.19-p.68, Ls.5-22.) He approached to speak with her about the
turn signal violation. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.68, Ls.23-25.) When Deputy Vogt made contact
with Ms. Cargile, he believed she appeared nervous when he requested her license and
registration. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.48, Ls.1-7.) With Ms. Cargile's license and registration
in hand, Deputy Vogt returned to his car and quickly learned that her license was valid
and she had no warrants for her arrest.

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.48, Ls.12-16.)

He also

learned that Ms. Cargile had previous drug arrests and a concealed weapons arrest.
(Tr.10/25/2010, p.48, Ls.12-16.)
In the meantime, Deputy Picola arrived with the canine.

(Tr.10/25/2012, p.48,

Ls.17-21.) The two deputies discussed Ms. Cargile's arrest record.

(Tr.10/25/2012,

p.48, L.24-p.49, L.1.) Eight minutes after stopping Ms. Cargile, Deputy Vogt was ready
to run the drug dog around her vehicle.

(Tr.10/25/2012, p.48, L.17-p.49, L.1, p.73,

Ls.13-19, p.87, Ls.10-16.)
Deputy Vogt approached Ms. Cargile and demanded that she exit her vehicle.
(Tr.10/25/2010, p.49, Ls.8-9.) Ms. Cargile refused to exit her vehicle and attempted to
lock the officers out of her truck. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.49, L.25-p.50,L.2.) Deputy Vogt told
Ms. Cargile that she was under arrest and reached in through the window and physical
detained Ms. Cargile. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.50, Ls.3-5.) Deputy Picola entered through the
passenger side door, threw Ms. Cargile's belongings on the ground, and opened the
door for Deputy Vogt.

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.50, Ls.5-6.)

The canine alerted on

Ms. Cargile's bag on the ground. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.50, L.18-p.51, L.1.)
Deputy Vogt did not cite Ms. Cargile for failing to use her turn signal.
(Tr.10/25/2012, p.84, Ls.1-4, p.86, Ls.20-22.)
3

The prosecutor charged Ms. Cargile by

Information with the crimes of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, resisting and/or obstructing an officer, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R.38855, pp.34-35.)
Ms. Cargile filed a Motion And Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Exclude
Evidence And Dismiss Case.

(R. 38855, pp.53-61.)

She argued that the officer

abandoned the reasons for stopping her and conducted an illegal search. (R. 38855,
pp.53-61.)

After receiving additional discovery, Ms. Cargile filed an additional

memorandum in anticipation of the State's argument that Ms. Cargile lacked standing to
challenge the illegal search of her vehlcle. (R. 38855, pp.65-72.)
The State filed their objection to Ms. Cargile's motion. It argued that she waived
her Fourth Amendment Right when she agreed to probation in Supreme Court Docket
Number 38867. (R.38855, pp.74-93.) At the hearing, the State also argued that the
duration of the traffic stop, including waiting for the drug dog to arrive, did not exceed
the initial purpose or scope of the stop. (Tr.10/25/2012, p.100, Ls.5-19, p.103, L.22.)
The traffic stop was expanded due to Ms. Cargile's suspicious actions. (Tr.10/25/2012,
p.101, L.1-p.102, L.22.) Finally, the State argued that the officers would have inevitably
discovered the drugs because of Ms. Cargile's arrest for obstruction. (Tr.10/25/2012,
p.102, L.23-p.103, L.6.)
After conducting a hearing, the district court denied Ms. Cargile's motion.
(R.38855, pp.101-102, 146-151.)

Initially, the district court found that Ms. Cargile

consented to the search as a condition of her felony probation; however, it reversed its
decision holding that the Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Turek, Docket No.
36596, 2011 Opinion No. 8, filed March 2, 2011, effectively overruled its decision.
(R., p.146.) The court found that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion of
4

criminal activity. (R., p.149.) Therefore, the facts permitted a lawful expansion of the
purpose of the stop. (R., p.150.) Additionally, the stop was not expanded beyond the
reasonable time for the traffic stop.

(R., p.150.) The court determined that the facts

allowed the officers to continue the investigation and pursuant to Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), allowed the officers to demand Ms. Cargile exit her
vehicle. (R., p.150.) Alternatively, the district court determined that the resisting and
obstructing arrest would have led to the inevitable discovery of the methamphetamine
and paraphernalia. (R., p.150.)
Ms. Cargile entered into a conditional guilty plea. (Tr.11/04/2010, p.1, Ls.12-17;
R., pp.123-124.)

She agreed to plead guilty to the charges, reserving her right to

challenge the district court's decision to deny the suppression motion. (Tr.11/04/2010,
p.1, Ls.12-17, p.2, Ls.3-6, p.23, Ls.1-8; R., pp.123-124.)

The district court imposed

upon Ms. Cargile a unified sentence of thirteen years, with four years fixed.
(Tr.05/26/2011, p.13, Ls.13-16; R., pp.155, 158-162.)

Ms. Cargile timely appealed.

(R., pp.163, 164-166.)

B.

Supreme Court Docket Number 38867
In Supreme Court docket number 38867 (district court # H0400363), the

prosecutor charged Ms. Cargile by Information with possession of a controlled
substance and concealing a dangerous weapon.

(R.38867, pp.30-31.)

Defense

counsel moved for a competency evaluation (R. 38867, pp.49-50) and the district court
ordered the I.C. § 18-211 examination (R. 38867, pp.53-55). After the court found her
competent, the case proceeded to trial.

(R. 38867, pp.64-65.)

In August 2004,

Ms. Cargile agreed to plead guilty to both counts; in exchange, the State agreed to
dismiss another case, and to "open recommendation for probation, jail."

5

(R. 38867,

pp.68-69.)

In September 2004, the district court imposed upon Ms. Cargile a unified

sentence of five years, with one year fixed, for her guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance.

2

(R. 38867, pp.76, 81-88.)

The district court suspended the

sentence and placed her probation for five years probation. (R. 38867, pp. 76, 81-88.)
In 2006, the probation officer requested and the court authorized discretionary jail
time because Ms. Cargile tested positive for amphetamines four separate times
between April 18, 2005 and February 24, 2006. (R. 38867, p.108.) A few months later,
the

probation officer alleged that Ms. Cargile tested positive for amphetamine,

thereafter, failed to submit to several urinalysis tests, and, then again tested positive for
amphetamines. (R. 38867, pp.109-110.) The district court approved discretionary jail
time.

(R. 38867, p.110.)

In March 2007, the prosecutor filed a motion for probation

violation. (R. 38867, pp.120-124.) Ms. Cargile admitted to four of the allegations, the
court dismissed the remaining allegations. (R. 38867, pp.129, 131.) The district court
revoked probation and placed 1\/ls. Cargile in the retained jurisdiction program.
(R. 38867, pp.137, 138-140.)

After Ms. Cargile successfully participated in the

programming, the district court suspended execution of the sentence and placed
1\/ls. Cargile on probation for seven (7) years, starting at the original date of the
judgment. (R. 38867, pp.143, 145-148.)
In July 2010, the probation officer filed a motion for probation violation.
(R. 38867, pp.165-168.) The prosecutor alleged that Ms. Cargile committed new crimes
of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to delivery, resisting and/or

2

The Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Cargile's motion to augment to include a
number of transcripts relevant to Supreme Court Docket Number 38867. See Order
dated December 21, 2011. Therefore, counsel will rely on the clerk's record to support
her arguments.
6

obstructing, and possessed drug paraphernalia on June 23, 2010. (R. 38867, pp.165168.) Additionally, the prosecutor alleged that Ms. Cargile used drugs on several days
in 2007 and 2008.
probation.

(R. 38867, pp.165-168.)

Ms. Cargile admitted she violated

(Tr.11/08/2010, p.8, Ls.20-23; R. 38867, pp.188-189.)

She admitted she

committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver,
possessed metharnphetamine, committed the crime of resisting and/or obstructing an
officer, committed the crime of possessing drug paraphernalia, and possessed drug
paraphernalia. (Tr.11/8/2010, p.9, L.9-p.10, L.22.) While waiting for the disposition of
her probation hearing, the district court granted Ms. Cargile a temporary furlough.
(R.38867, pp.195-197.) Ms. Cargile escaped while on the furlough. (R. 38867, pp.201202.) The prosecutor filed another allegation of probation violation because Ms. Cargile
allegedly committing a new crime of escape. (R. 38867, pp.217-219.) The district court
revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence of five years, with one year
fixed.

(R.38867, pp.228-229; 230-232.)

Ms. Cargile timely appealed the Order Of

Revocation Of Probation And Imposition Of Sentence And Commitment.

(R.38867,

pp.233-235.)

C.

Supreme Court Docket Number 38868
In Supreme Court docket number 38868 (district court# CR-FE-2010-0020122),

the prosecutor charged Ms. Cargile by Information with the crime of escape. (R., pp.2021.) Ms. Cargile pleaded guilty to escape and, in exchange, the State agreed to make
specific sentencing recommendations. (Tr.05/19/2011, p.5, L.21-p.6, L.2, p.12, Ls.1012.) She admitted that while in custody on case number 38855 the district court granted
her a furlough and, instead of returning to custody, she fled to Springdale, Washington.
(Tr.05/19/2011, p.13, Ls.2-20.) Marshals eventually apprehended her in Hayden, Idaho.
7

(Tr.05/19/2011, p.13, Ls.22-25.) The district court imposed upon Ms. Cargile a unified
sentence of four years, with one year fixed, to be served consecutive to Supreme Court
Docket Number 38855. (Tr.05/26/2011, p.13, Ls.16-18.)

8

ISSUES
1)

Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Cargile's suppression motion
because when Deputy Vogt approached Ms. Cargile's vehicle, for a second time,
and demanded that she exit her vehicle, he had abandoned the purposes of the
traffic stop, thereby unreasonably extending the stop beyond the original
purpose?

2)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Cargile's probation
and executed the underlying sentence of five years, with one year fixed?

3)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Ms. Cargile a
unified sentence of four, with one year fixed, following her guilty plea to escape?

9

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Cargile's Suppression Motion Because
When Deputy Vogt Approached Ms. Cargile's Vehicle, For A Second Time, And
Demanded That She Exit Her Vehicle, He Had Abandoned The Purposes Of The Traffic
Stop, Thereby Unreasonably Extending The Stop Beyond The Original Purpose
A.

Introduction
Law enforcement unreasonably extended the traffic stop lawfully extended the

stop of Ms. Cargile. As such, the district court's order denying Ms. Cargile's motion to
suppress should be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.

State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho

336, 338 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are accepted;
however, the application of constitutlonal principles to the facts as found are freely
reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886 (2001). At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh evidence, resolve factual conflicts
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.

State v. Valdez-Molina, 127

Idaho 102, 106 (1995).

C.

Law Enforcement Officers
Ms. Cargile

Unreasonably Extended The Traffic Stop Of

The Idaho and Federal Constitutions protect "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of these
constitutional rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of
10

discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and
security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App.
2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)).

The constitutions

safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the seizures of
persons through detentions falling short of arrest or arrests. United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). The stop of a
vehicle constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is, therefore, subject to the
constitutional restraints.

State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208 (Ct. App. 1998).

A

vehicle stop is of limited magnitude compared to other types of seizures; however, it is
nonetheless a "constutionally cognizable" intrusion and, therefore, may not be
conducted "at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials."

Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
When the purpose of the detention is to investigate a possible traffic offense or
other crime, it must be based upon reasonable, aritculable suspicion of criminal activity.
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2001); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
498 (1983).

Although the required information leading to formation of reasonable

suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the information required to form
probable cause, it still "must be more than mere speculation or a hunch on the part of
the police officer."

State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005).

The

reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the seizure. Flowers, 131 Idaho at 208.
In the case at hand, during a turn, Ms. Cargile failed to use a turn signal and
continued driving for approximately two miles before Deputy Vogt initiated a traffic stop.

11

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.45, Ls.13-23.) Ms. Cargile does not challenge the legality of the initial
detention. However, she asserts that the officers unreasonably extended the stop.
A routine traffic stop is normally limited in scope and of short duration; therefore,
it is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and, as such, is
analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440
U.S. at 653-654.

Under Terry, an investigative detention is permissible if it is based

upon specific aritculable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 21.
The question of whether an investigative detention is reasonable requires an
inquiry into both whether the officer's action was justified at the inception, and whether it
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2000). However, the
purpose of a stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated; a routine traffic stop might
turn up suspicious circumstances that justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the
stop. Id. at 362.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that an investigative detention
"must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop."

State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).

Further, an individual "may not be detained even

momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so."

Id.

In United

States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2001 ), the court held that, "[f]urther detention

was not lawful after the point at which the purposes of the stop [were] resolved." Id. at
398.

12

It is therefore not necessarily a constitutional violation for an officer who has
stopped someone for a traffic violation to ask unrelated questions about drugs or to run
a drug dog around the outside of the vehicle.
(Ct. App. 2005).

State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563

Idaho Courts have held that the questioning and use of a drug dog

during a stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment when it does not extend the
duration of the stop beyond that which was necessary to address the traffic violation.
See State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852-853 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an officer's
request to search a car was lawful where the request was made before the issuance of
the traffic citation had been completed and such request lengthened the process only by
a second or two); see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-363 (holding that it was
permissible for one officer to question a vehicle's driver about drugs and weapons and
to take a drug dog around the car while another officer was busy checking with dispatch
on the driver's status and writing out a traffic citation).
In contrast, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that it was an unwarranted
intrusion upon the vehicle occupants' privacy and liberty for an officer to question a
driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose
of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651-653.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that a motorist had been unlawfully detained
where all routine traffic stop procedures had been completed when additional officers
arrived and then requested consent to search the vehicle. State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho
532 (Ct. App. 2000).
Ms. Cargile asserts that the officers improperly extended their stop beyond the
purpose of issuing a citation for failing to use her turn signal. The State presented no
evidence that Deputy Vogt had even begun to write the citation during the eight minutes
13

that he had Ms. Cargile seized.

Deputy Vogt's testimony revealed that he routinely

waits before even approaching a vehicle that he has stopped for a traffic violation. He
stated under oath, "Most the times I'll wait because I've called for that officer, so I want
to wait for that officer. So a majority of the times, I'll wait for that officer just because I
ask for them. There is a reason I ask for them, so I want to wait until he gets there
before I approach." (Tr., p.61, Ls.14-19.) The deputy further explained that his decision
to contact Deputy Picola was that it was routine to call for him to bring the drug dog to
the scene. (Tr., p.61, L.24-p.62, L.15.) Therefore, Deputy Vogt's own testimony reveals
that he consistently and routinely delays a standard traffic stop in order for the drug dog
to arrive on the scene.
Although Deputy Vogt also testified about the proper procedure for not violating
the federal and state constitution, he did not follow that procedure in this case.
(Tr., p.69, L.23-p.70, L.3.) He explained that once he writes the citation, he approaches
the driver and asks the driver to exit their vehicle to explain the citation and, in the
meantime, the drug dog is ran around the vehicle. (Tr., p.69, L.23-p.70, L.3.) However,
in this case, there was no testimony that Deputy Vogt even began to write the ticket.
( See generally Tr.10/28/2010.)

He prolonged the stop for purposes other than the

reasons for the stop - the failure to use a turn signal.

D.

The State Failed To Demonstrate That The Officer Possessed Reasonable
Suspicion To Expand The Scope Of Ms. Cargile's Stop
In this case, Ms. Cargile was detained longer than necessary to effectuate the

purpose of the stop.

There were no objective grounds for extending the stop. The

district court's findings to the contrary are in error.
The district court stated:
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Vogt had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Vogt is an
experienced narcotics officer. His reasonable suspicion was based on the
following articulable facts: Cargille's [sic] eye movements, her refusal to
stop when Vogt's overhead lights were activated, her continual driving for
another quarter of a mile, and after Vogt activated his siren she drove
across the oncoming lane into a parking lot and parked behind buildings
out of public view. All of this was unusual and alerted Vogt to the
possibility of additional criminal activity beyond the signal violations.
(R., pp.149-150.)
Although the deputy could not recall if she was wearing sunglasses, he thought
she was looking at him out of the corner of her eye. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.63, Ls.14-1 ?p.64,
Ls. 1-2, p.83, Ls.13-15.) He believed she avoided looking directly at him in the mirror.
(Tr.10/25/2012, p.63, Ls.4-6, 14-17.) Yet, cautious and trying to act calm when a police
officer is behind a driver does not result any suspicion of criminal activity. The officer
even admitted that it is not uncommon for people to act nervous when an officer is
behind them. (Tr.10/25/2012, p.62, Ls.18-25.) Regardless, Deputy Vogt knew that he
was going to look for drugs before he even activated his overhead lights as he called for
the drug dog to meet him on the scene.

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.69, L.23-p.70, L.3, p.82,

Ls.8-10, p.83, Ls.9-12.)
Deputy Vogt admitted that there was a significant amount of traffic traveling both
directions. (Tr.10/28/2012, p.64, Ls.12-20.) Ms. Cargile was traveling in the inner lane,
closest to the center lane. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.65, Ls.3-8.) She didn't notice the deputy
for a quarter of a mile; however, when he signaled to her with his siren she turned into
the turn lane, safely crossed the road, and safely parked in a parking space, not
blocking the business' driveway.

(Tr.10/25/2010, p.46, Ls.11-19, p.67, Ls.9-19.)

Deputy Vogt admitted that Ms. Cargile's driving did not cause him to believe that she
was under the influence. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.62, Ls.7-10, p.82, L.25-p.83, L.2, p.83, Ls.35.)
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Ms. Cargile provided a valid license and registration and had no warrants for her
arrest. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.48, Ls.12-16.) Although, Ms. Cargile did have a past record,
that does not provide reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. (Tr.10/25/2010,
p.48, Ls.12-16.)
Deputy Vogt made it clear that he was going to run a drug dog around this car
and he made that decision before he activated the lights to stop Ms. Cargile. Deputy
Vogt made the decision based upon the circumstances that existed at that moment,
which was that Ms. Cargile drove an old pickup truck, she failed to use a turn signal,
and her looks were typical of someone trying to act cool under the circumstances. After
being alerted by a siren, Ms. Cargile turned into a business on the opposite side of the
street and pulled into a parking lot stall. Deputy Vogt found this unusual. Under the
totality of the circumstances, the above facts do not create reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity in order to extend the stop. At best, the officer had a hunch
and was going to follow with his original decision to have the drug dog ran around the
vehicle. When he approached the vehicle for the second time, he had abandoned the
purposes of the stop, which was to issue a ticket for the failure to signal, and because
he lacked articulable, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he illegally extended the
scope of the stop.

E.

All Evidence Collected Against Ms. Cargile Following The Unreasonable
Extension Of The Traffic Stop Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal
Governmental Activity
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only

to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 815 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v.
Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether, granting establishment of
16

the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of
Guilt, p.221 (1959)).
While the defendant bears the initial burden of going forward with evidence of a
"factual nexus" between the illegality and the evidence, the State has the ultimate
burden of persuasion to show that the evidence is untainted. State v. Babb, 136 Idaho
95, 98 (Ct. App. 2001); see also United States v. Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d 1128, 1131
(10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kandik, 633 F.2d 1334, 1335 (9th Cir. 1980).
Suppression is required only if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have
come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton,
142 Idaho 180,184 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Nava-Ramirez, 210

3d at 1131).

In the case at hand, the above evidence clearly shows that Ms. Cargile was only
legally stopped for a traffic violation and that no evidence was discovered until the
officers unreasonably extended the stop. This provides the necessary factual nexus,
and thereby, shifts the burden of persuasion to the State to show that the evidence is
untainted. The state failed to meet this burden; therefore, all the evidence collected
after the impermissible extension of the stop (the methamphetamine and paraphernalia)
must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police activity.
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II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Cargile's Probation And
Executed The Underlying Sentence Of Five Years, With One Year Fixed
Ms. Cargile asserts the district court abused its discretion after revoking her
probation and executing the previously suspended sentence. Ms. Cargile asserts that
the district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce her sentence.
In a probation revocation proceeding, the district court addresses three issues:
First, was a condition of probation violated? Second, does the violation justify
revocation? Finally, if probation is revoked, what prison sentence should be imposed?

State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The district court is empowered
with the authority to reduce the original sentence pursuant to Rule 35. Id. On appeal,
Ms. Cargile does not dispute the district court's findings that she violated probation by
committing the crime of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver,
possessing methamphetamine, committing the crime of resisting and/or obstructing an
officer, committing the crime of possessing drug paraphernalia, and possessing drug
paraphernalia.

(Tr.11/8/2010, p.9, L.9-p.10, L.22.)

court's decision to revoke probation.

Nor does she dispute the district

However, she contends that the district court

should have sua sponte reduced her sentence.
The third question to be answered in a probation revocation proceeding, is what
prison sentence should be imposed?

State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App.

2001). In answering this third question, the appellate courts examine the entire record
encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

State v. Adams, 115

Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, where a
sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse
of discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence.
18

State v. Jackson, 130

Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).
Ms. Cargile does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Ms. Cargile must show that in light
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.
Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)).

The governing criteria or objectives of

criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.

(quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on

other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001 )).

Ms. Cargile asserts that, in failing to reduce her sentence, the district court did
not give proper weight to her remorse and desire to change her ways.

Ms. Cargile

explained at the disposition hearing, "I believe I have touched on all of the subjects of
my immoralities and I am ready to lead a new life. And with that being said, I am ready
for your judgment." (Tr.05/27/2011, p.5, Ls.11-14.) In the PSI, Ms. Cargile indicated
that she realized that she was 35 years old and wasted a majority of her life.
(Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) She appeared to recognize that she was
an intelligent human that could contribute greatly to society. (PSI, p.3.)
Ms. Cargile also has valuable employment skills. (PSI, pp.7-8.) She has worked
as a welder, a recycler, tile layer, mason, drywall finisher, window installer, healthcare
provider, food handler, and animal trainer. (PSI, pp.7-8.) She will have little difficulty
finding work when released from prison.
Ms. Cargile has experienced with several illegal substance. (Tr.05/27/2011, p.6,
Ls.10-20.) Although she does not specifically agree to participate in substance abuse
19

treatment, she indicates that she is willing and wanting to turn her life around, which
would necessitate treatment. (Tr.05/27/2011, p. 7, Ls.3-14.)
In light of the evidence presented to the district court, it should have reduced the
sentence executed upon Ms. Cargile so that she could participate in treatment while
readjusting to society.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Consecutive Unified
Sentence Of Four Years, With One Year Fixed
Ms. Cargile asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of four
years, with one year fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Cargile does not allege that
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Ms. Cargile must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120

Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
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rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.

Id. (quoting State v.

Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)).

At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Cargile apologized to the court. (Tr.05/26/2011,
p.12, L.23.) She stated:
First of all, to you, I'd like to apologize. You did grant me a great
kindness, and it was not my intention to take advantage of that. And in my
letter that I addressed to the court for the defendant's version and also to
be used as the comments to the court, I believe I touched on all of the
subjects of my immoralities in that letter. And I'm ready to live, and I'm
ready to lead a new life, and I'm ready to be sentenced.
(Tr.05/26/2011, p.12, L.23-p.13, L.5.)
For reasons also identified in section II, Ms. Cargile asserts that the district court
abused its discretion imposing an excessive sentence.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Cargile respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's order
denying her suppression motion.

She also requests that this Court reduce her

sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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